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Abstract 
The ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory has generated a wealth of deliberative 
experiments. The purpose of deliberation as a research technique (as opposed to 
policymaking or public consultation) is distinctive: to uncover the public’s informed, 
considered, and collective view on a normative question. In the social science context, 
this often arises in relation to research on poverty, well-being and inequality, where 
there is a need to define and justify the thresholds and concepts adopted on a deeper 
basis than convention alone can offer. This paper compares deliberative research to 
more traditional methods of studying the values of the general public, such as in-depth 
interviewing, attitudinal surveys, and participatory approaches, and reveals that 
deliberative designs involve a number of assumptions, including a strong fact/value 
distinction, an emphasis on ‘outsider’ expertise, and a view of participants as 
essentially similar to each other rather than defined by socio-demographic differences.  
Normative decisions permeate the design and implementation of deliberative research, 
so while it has the potential to provide uniquely considered, insightful and well-
justified answers to the problem of defining a collective position on key questions in 
social science, transparency at all stages of the process is essential.  
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research design. 
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1. Motivation and background 
Many problems in social science require decisions to be made which are value-laden. 
This is particularly the case in relation to research on poverty, well-being, quality of 
life and related concepts. For example, what is an ‘adequate’ standard of living? What 
aspects of life are relevant to an overall assessment of well-being? How should the 
different components of a multi-dimensional measure of poverty be combined? What 
is an appropriate trade-off between length and quality of life in calculating a QALY? 
Confronted with these problems researchers have a number of options. They may 
attempt to justify a decision with respect to a “scientific” criterion (for example, 
Gordon, 2006) or impose their own judgement and acknowledge its arbitrariness (for 
example, Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud, 1999), or refer to an equally arbitrary 
convention (for example, Trinczek, 2007). Even when combined with sensitivity 
testing to check the robustness of the conclusions to different plausible values, any of 
these options is associated with a significant degree of embarrassment and a sense that 
it threatens to undermine the impact of the research, if not its validity. One 
increasingly popular strategy to overcome this obstacle is to undertake deliberative 
research with the general public, to elicit their views and value judgements, thereby, 
apparently, absolving the researcher of responsibility for the decision that is made.  
 
However such a strategy raises a number of important questions. Why, and in what 
circumstances, is deliberative research a better technique for eliciting the values of 
‘ordinary people’ than other methods, such as in-depth interviews, large-scale 
attitudinal surveys or participatory approaches? How should deliberative exercises be 
designed to maximise their validity and reliability and minimise the risks of various 
sources of bias? Do the results really get researchers ‘off the hook’ when it comes to 
making value judgements? 
 
These questions form the focus of this paper, with particular application to the 
problem of specifying and justifying a list of central and valuable capabilities, that is, 
a list of the priorities for public policy or for evaluating a given state of affairs, 
expressed in terms of the things that people are able to be and to do in their lives (their 
‘capabilities’). Examples include, ‘being healthy’ or ‘being able to go out without 
shame’. The problem of how to define such a list has been much discussed in the 
capability approach literature. According to one of the leading theorists, Martha 
Nussbaum, a list of central human capabilities with purportedly universal application 
at a general level can be developed through a priori reasoning, and she has provided 
such a list (Nussbaum, 2002). This is in contrast to the position advocated by Amartya 
Sen, who argues that the capabilities to be prioritised in any given context should be 
identified through a process of democratic public debate, scrutiny and criticism (see, 
for example, Sen, 1999). However, as Alkire (2002) observes, Sen does not describe 
through what particular mechanisms public deliberation on the selection of 
capabilities is to take place, nor does he fully address the difficulties of constructing 
democratic forums within undemocratic or grossly unequal societies. This lack of 
specificity has led to a number of attempts to clarify the role for democratic and 
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participatory processes in Sen’s capability approach, both in theory and in practice 
(especially Crocker, 2003, 2006, 2007).  
 
Our own work (Burchardt and Vizard, 2011) on the construction of a capability list 
took place in the context of the development of an Equality Measurement Framework 
for Britain in the 21
st
 century, and included two phases of deliberative workshops with 
the general public and with individuals and groups at particular risk of discrimination 
and disadvantage. Fieldwork was carried out by the social research institute of Ipsos-
MORI (2007). It was initiated by the Equalities Review in 2007, an independent 
committee appointed by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair, and subsequently 
continued under the auspices of the Government Equalities Office (GEO) and the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC).
1
  
 
In the course of designing and implementing our method for specifying a capability 
list, fit for the purpose of monitoring the (lack of) progress towards creating a more 
equal society in Britain, we encountered a number of theoretical and methodological 
challenges. This paper reflects on the problems relating to the deliberative components 
of the method. It also draws on interviews with three of the leading research 
organisations in the UK using deliberative methods and with the then head of 
Government Social Research, which we carried out subsequent to our own 
deliberative exercise in order to understand more about the uses to which these 
techniques were being put in a range of policy-relevant contexts. The purpose of this 
piece is not to report in detail on the findings of our own deliberative exercise but 
rather to use it as an example with which to discuss the potential, and limitations, of 
deliberative methods as an approach to eliciting value judgements in social science. 
 
2. Why deliberate? 
The theoretical roots of deliberative research lie in political philosophy – an unusual 
origin for a social scientific tool. Developments in democratic theory around two 
decades ago shifted the understanding of democracy as a system of aggregating 
conflicting preferences towards considering it as a process of preference formation 
and transformation, brought about through communication between informed and 
respectful equals (Dryzek, 2010). Deliberative democrats emphasise that policies 
should be justified through the exchange of reasons and arguments relevant to all, 
rather than being the result of competition between private or personal interests where 
the most powerful lobby wins out (Weinstock and Kahane, 2010). This has a number 
of implications, for example that citizens’ participation in debate is essential, 
including becoming better informed and encountering contrasting points of view, as 
opposed to merely expressing pre-formed opinions through the ballot-box.  
                                                     
1
  The GEO has responsibility for coordinating and promoting the government’s strategy on 
equality, while the EHRC is a statutory, publicly-funded body at arm’s length from 
government, with a mandate to protect and promote equality and human rights in accordance 
with the Equality Act 2006. 
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The conditions in which such ‘public reasoning’ can take place have been much 
discussed (Fraser, 1989; Young, 2000; Richardson, 2002; Dean, 2009), and it is 
recognised that deliberation in practice is unlikely to reach the ‘ideal speech situation’ 
described by Habermas (1996): “free from domination, coercion, manipulation and 
strategising” so that “the only power remaining is that of the better argument.” 
Nevertheless these theoretical foundations have prompted, directly or indirectly, 
several experiments in real-world deliberative democracy. Perhaps the most widely 
known is participatory budgeting, begun in Porto Alegre in Brazil in 1989 and 
subsequently applied in various forms all over the world (Baiocchi, 2003; de Sousa 
Santos, 2005). Preparatory meetings in local neighbourhoods on various issues of 
concern precede plenary sessions to decide the city budget. 
 
A number of claims are made for such exercises, including that they strengthen 
citizens’ power in decision-making, especially among disadvantaged sections of the 
population; that they embody open and transparent government; and that they enhance 
the legitimacy of the decisions reached (Cabinet Office, 2006; Michels, 2011; Searing 
et al, 2007). These can broadly be classified as ‘intrinsic democratic’ justifications for 
deliberative policymaking. Claims are also made for the potential of deliberative 
forums to increase accountability (Involve/NCC, 2008; OLR, 2007) but Parkinson 
(2006) observes that even where policymakers are held accountable for their decisions 
to the participants in a deliberative consultation (which is the exception rather than the 
rule), the participants’ own lack of accountability to the wider population limits the 
overall gain in accountability. 
 
In other instances, deliberative exercises have accompanied policymaking processes, 
rather than being the sole input. For example, in the UK, the body that issues guidance 
on the cost-effectiveness of new drugs and treatments, the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), incorporates a standing 30-member citizens’ 
council. The long-run commitment of participants facilitates the acquisition of 
expertise, both technical and procedural, but the number of individuals involved is 
small (Davies, Wetherell, and Barnett, 2006). In contrast, the Department for Work 
and Pensions organised a one-off large-scale deliberative summit, at which over 1000 
members of the general public deliberated on the four options presented in the 
Pensions Commission report (DWP, 2006). The results fed into the government’s 
response to the Commission. This might perhaps be more accurately classified as a 
form of public consultation, rather than policymaking per se.  
 
The stated rationales for deliberative consultation, as distinct from policymaking, are 
often more pragmatic – for example, that including public deliberation improves the 
quality and breadth of information on which decisions are made and hence the 
effectiveness of the policies devised (Bennett et al, 2004). In addition, they may 
emphasise the instrumental democratic gains, in terms of increasing participants’ 
confidence, especially finding a ‘voice’ in a public forum; building a (sustainable) 
network among participants; promoting social cohesion through increased 
understanding between people with diverse values and backgrounds; fostering 
working relationships between stakeholder groups and government; and building 
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public trust in government  (Cabinet Office, 2006; Michels, 2011; Searing et al, 2007; 
Wakeford, and Singh, 2008).  
 
Genuine consultation is a two-way process. But a number of deliberative exercises, 
perhaps particularly on scientific and technical topics, are best seen as promoting 
public engagement in an existing policy, or even as part of a government  
communication strategy, for example the GM Nation debate (Rowe et al, 2005). 
Developing a communication strategy for an existing policy through deliberative 
means could include gaining information about the acceptability of different policy 
options, and whether participants’ attitudes change in response to different forms of 
presentation of the policy. OLR (2007) note that staging a deliberative event is a 
‘media-friendly’ form of activity, because it offers ready access to video footage and 
interviews with ‘ordinary people’. This may be a legitimate activity for government, 
but the conflation of such publicity stunts with more serious deliberative undertakings 
threatens to give deliberation as a whole a bad name, and to undermine the 
instrumental democratic benefits claimed for deliberative consultation. 
 
Yet other deliberative forums have tackled policy questions from outside the formal 
policymaking process, such as citizens juries run by think-tanks and pressure groups 
on issues as diverse as child poverty (Fabian Society, 2005) and rationing healthcare 
(Lenaghan, 1999). The objective here is to elicit information about the public’s views 
on the subject under discussion, and then present the results to a wider audience, 
including to policymakers and other stakeholders. The justifications overlap with 
deliberation as policymaking and deliberation as consultation, but the less closely a 
deliberative exercise is tied to a policymaking process, the more it begins to look like 
research. Indeed deliberation is increasingly used as a standalone research technique. 
Again a range of descriptors is used, including deliberative workshops, focus-groups, 
polls, and consultation. The core rationale for deliberative research is to uncover the 
informed, considered, views of members of the general public, often on complex 
issues to which they may not previously have given much attention.  
 
The roles of deliberation as policymaking, as consultation, public engagement or 
communication, and as research are not always as carefully delineated as they should 
be, which has produced some mistaken claims and criticisms. Evans and Kotchetkova 
(2009) observe that in the context of scientific issues, deliberative exercises often blur 
the boundary between academic research and promoting public engagement. Indeed 
the ‘research’ component may be reduced to ensuring that the best possible conditions 
for deliberation are provided and reporting the conclusions of the exercise (Evans and 
Kotchetkova, 2009, p640). I want to argue here that deliberative research does have a 
distinctive role to play, provided its purpose and particular application are well-
aligned.   
 
A number of authors offer sets of criteria against which deliberative exercises should 
be assessed. For example, Papadopoulous and Warin (2007) highlight the need to 
scrutinise openness and access, quality of deliberation, efficiency and effectiveness, 
and transparency and accountability, while Gutmann and Thompson (1996) focus on 
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reciprocity, publicity and accountability. Chilvers (2008) summarises his criteria as 
representativeness, inclusivity, clarity, transparency, legitimacy, adaptability, learning 
and efficiency. However as we have seen, there is a spectrum of purposes of 
deliberative exercises from direct policy-making, through public consultation or 
engagement, to research on public values, with a different blend of rationales for 
engaging in deliberation associated with each purpose. Most of the criteria developed 
in the literature refer to deliberation as a form of democratic decision-making (direct 
or indirect), rather than as a form of research. There remains a need to develop an 
understanding of how the quality and appropriateness of deliberative exercises as part 
of research projects can be assessed, and specifically in the context of projects 
intended to elicit the values of members of the general public.  
 
3. Deliberation as research 
The numbers of participants, recruitment procedures, duration of involvement, 
structure and content of the process, and types of analysis and interpretation vary 
widely within and between forms of deliberative research, including deliberative 
workshops, focus-groups, polls, and ‘consultation’. Deliberation may therefore be best 
characterised as an ‘approach’ to research, rather than as a specific method. The 
deliberative approach has three features, derived from its theoretical underpinnings, 
that distinguish it from other types of research. Firstly, the aim of the research is to 
reach people’s informed and considered judgements and underlying values in relation 
to the subject in hand, through a process of public reasoning. Public reasoning implies, 
as a minimum, encounters with contrasting points of view and a requirement to justify 
opinions through arguments which make sense to others (Rawls, 1997). Secondly, the 
process involves researchers providing information (sometimes written, but often 
through experts available for questioning) to participants about the subject under 
discussion. Thirdly, and related to the preceding points, there is an expectation that the 
beliefs and values of participants may be transformed by involvement in the research. 
The intentional and direct input of new information by researchers and the assumption 
that participants’ views may change as a result of the exercise, stands in contrast, of 
course, to the efforts made in most other qualitative research modes to facilitate 
discussion and elicit participants’ views while  minimising the extent to which the 
researcher’s presence and activity ‘pollutes’ the field of study.  
 
How then does deliberative research compare to other techniques which are 
commonly used to study people’s values? Table 1 provides a summary. Deliberative 
research is perhaps closest to participatory research. All deliberative research is 
participatory in the sense that participants are active in the research process and 
operate, at least in part, through a collective forum. In both instances, there is an 
expectation that participants’ views may be transformed by the research itself – in the 
case of deliberative research, through new information and encounters with the 
arguments of others, and in the case of participatory research, through the 
emancipatory effect of an empowering process. Nevertheless in deliberative research, 
the research questions, methods (including selection of participants), and the form of 
 6 
 
the output, are often defined by an external authority such as the researcher or funder 
and it therefore does not fulfil Chambers’ (1997) definition of fully participatory 
research. Many participatory exercises fall short of this ideal but the greater the 
control participants have over the process, the more participatory it is, while for 
deliberative research there is no such objective. For example, the Deliberative Polls 
devised by Fishkin (2009) follow a highly specific formula, based on a standard 
opinion survey issued to a random sample, followed by deliberation in small groups 
with carefully balanced briefing and access to experts for questions, and finally a 
second survey to establish the extent of change in participants’ views. This is a far cry 
from the participatory research paradigm. Some attempts have been made to define 
and put into practice ‘bottom up’ deliberation (Wakeford, 2007; Wakeford and Singh, 
2008), but this is by no means the norm.  
 
Moreover, not all participatory research is deliberative: participatory exercises often 
do not include the provision of information by the researcher or external ‘experts’ and  
indeed the participatory paradigm challenges the notion of external expertise 
altogether: “There are 2.8 billion poverty experts, the poor themselves. Yet the 
development discourse about poverty has been dominated by the perspectives and 
expertise of those who are not poor: professionals, politicians and agency officials. 
This book seeks to reverse this imbalance by focusing directly on the perspectives and 
expertise of poor people” (Narayan, 2000, p2). Displacing officially recognised 
knowledge and expertise and replacing it with lived experience of the disadvantaged is 
at the heart of the participatory enterprise. This is in contrast to deliberative processes, 
which explicitly aim to inject ‘evidence’ – usually defined as such by the researchers 
not the participants – into the discussion, to ensure that the deliberations are ‘well-
informed’.   
 
Discussions in participatory forums do not necessarily proceed through public 
reasoning and the identification of distinct interests and values is an important 
function of the research, facilitated by separate discussions with different groups – for 
example, men and women, young and old, ‘uppers’ and ‘lowers’ (Narayan, Prtichett 
and Kapoor, 2009). Again, this is in contrast to the deliberative ideal, where the 
objective is to create encounters between equals with divergent viewpoints and 
facilitate exchange of reasons leading to a common final position.  
 
So while both deliberative and participatory research involve collective discussion, 
and both seek to uncover the considered views of the participants, they diverge in 
terms of who sets the agenda (at least in the ideal case), the role of external expertise, 
and the intended endpoint (the identification of difference or the generation of 
consensus).  
 
Compared to deliberative approaches, more traditional methods to study people’s 
values such as in-depth interviews and large-scale attitudinal surveys offer limited 
opportunity for respondents to reflect on their own position, and they do not involve 
encounters with the views of others. Consequently the opinions expressed may not be 
very deeply considered, particularly if the subject matter is unfamiliar to the 
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respondent, and since there is little scope for the provision of additional information or 
evidence, they may also be poorly-informed. 
2
 But whether these characteristics are 
considered strengths or weaknesses depends crucially on the objective of the exercise. 
If the purpose of eliciting the views of respondents is to understand how the general 
public will behave (for example, their voting intentions or their commitment to 
recycling), the unmediated, untransformed opinions expressed through in-depth 
interviews and attitudinal surveys are likely to be a better guide than the highly 
processed and contingent views expressed at the close of an intensive deliberative 
workshop. As Fishkin (2010) notes, deliberation produces, “a representation of what 
the public would think under good conditions for thinking about it” (p196, emphasis 
added). This is quite different from understanding what the public do think – for 
which purpose in-depth interviewing or attitudinal surveys are certainly preferable.   
 
Table 1: Deliberative research compared to other techniques to study people’s values 
 
 Typical 
sample size 
Core purpose External 
information 
/expertise 
provided 
Engagement 
with the views 
of other 
participants 
Deliberative 
research 
10s to 1000s Consensus 
through public 
reasoning 
Y Y 
Participatory 
research 
 
10s to 100s Empowerment N Y 
In-depth 
interviews 
10s Qualitative 
analysis of 
difference 
N N 
Attitudinal 
surveys 
1000s Quantitative 
analysis of 
difference 
N N 
 
In addition there are fundamental epistemological differences between deliberative 
research and both attitudinal surveys and in-depth interviewing. Attitudinal surveys — 
indeed all large-scale surveys — draw on a positivist paradigm, incorporating the 
assumption that there are facts ‘out there’ to be discovered, including for example 
facts about poverty as well as about what people think about poverty. In-depth 
interviewing is more usually associated with a interpretativist perspective, in which 
meaning is assessed from the person’s own point of view and what is held to be true is 
                                                     
2
  Focus groups do involve encountering the views of others, and some also incorporate prompts 
or aids for discussion. However the short duration of most focus groups and the minimal 
external input limit the extent to which a transformation of participants’ beliefs or values is 
likely to take place.  
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generated through interaction between people (Habermas, 1967). What constitutes 
poverty, then, is socially constructed, and people’s attitudes towards poverty are 
contingent upon particular social interactions and dialogue. Deliberative methods 
appear to occupy a middle ground between these two poles. On the one hand, the 
information provided, for example through expert evidence, is often treated in a 
positivist sense as being about the world ‘out there’: even if evidence can be disputed, 
these are disputes about the state of the world. On the other hand, the considered 
values of the participants are often held to be generated and articulated only through 
engagement with others. Not all deliberative exercises characterise participants’ 
values in this way; large-scale deliberative polls, for example, appear to adopt a more 
thorough-going positivism, with participants’ underlying values already in existence 
and being revealed through reasoned debate. But the Habermasian origins of 
deliberation would certainly imply that the process is constitutive of participants’ 
values, not merely a means of articulating them.  
 
We have seen, then, that the choice of deliberation as a research design involves a 
number of epistemological and normative commitments, even before the particular 
exercise has been defined. In many cases, it depends on maintaining a fact/value 
distinction, with one foot in a positivist camp along with attitudinal surveys and the 
other with the social constructivists and in-depth interviewing. Like participatory 
research, it prioritises a collective process, but unlike participatory research, and 
indeed the more traditional methods, the objective is the identification of a consensus 
rather than analysis of individual or group-level differences. Outsider knowledge and 
expertise is valued as a necessary contribution to the information set for insiders, in 
contrast to the participatory research paradigm, although deliberators are assumed to 
be capable of sophisticated reasoning and judgement – qualities which are not usually 
called upon in respondents to more traditional modes of research such as in-depth or 
survey interviews.    
 
Given this unique orientation, we might expect deliberative research to be especially 
useful where establishing a collective position is more important than understanding 
differences between subgroups, and where the objective is to obtain considered, 
informed opinions on the subject in hand, rather than to extract information on 
attitudes which will be useful as a guide to people’s behaviour. The tasks of 
identifying a consensus on appropriate thresholds for poverty, or a list of central and 
valuable capabilities that should be a priority for public policy, appear to fit these 
criteria. So despite the limitations revealed by scrutiny of the foundations of 
deliberative research, its potential for ascertaining public value judgements remains. 
We now turn to consider whether deliberative research in practice lives up to its 
theoretical promise.  
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4. Deliberative research in practice  
Conducting deliberative research involves making a series of important 
methodological decisions, which can be summarised under the headings of selection 
of participants, provision of evidence, nature of deliberation, and analysis and 
interpretation. The choices made have a significant influence not only on the research 
process, I shall argue, but also on the likely outcomes.  
 
Selection of participants 
The number of participants in deliberative exercises ranges from a dozen members of  
a citizen’s jury up to deliberative summits of 1000 people. Several studies note a 
trade-off between the quality of discussion that can be achieved in small groups and 
the representativeness or spread of opinion made possible by larger numbers (Smith 
and Wales, 2000; Michels, 2011; White et al, 1999). Papadopoulous and Warin (2007) 
characterise it as a tension between ‘participationists’, who emphasise inclusion and 
representativeness, and ‘deliberationists’, who emphasise the quality of the discussion.  
 
The number of participants is related to the question of how they are sampled. There is 
a spectrum of representativeness, from statistically representative deliberative polls, 
via purposive sampling and small non-random groups, to self-selection or use of pre-
existing groups. Dienel (1999) and Fishkin and Luskin (2005) favour random 
sampling in order to be able to test statistical significance and produce generalisable 
results but Wakeford (2007) rejects statistical representativeness because it reproduces 
the minority status of groups who are already marginalised. In many cases, 
participants are recruited because of particular roles they occupy – for example, as 
patients or service users – or because of their socio-demographic characteristics, for 
example to address Wakeford’s concerns by ‘over-sampling’ minority groups. 
However both these strategies carry risks. Evans and Kotchetkova (2009) report an 
experiment comparing a deliberative workshop with focus groups composed of 
patients, carers and lay citizens, evaluating treatments for Type One diabetes. In the 
deliberative workshop, the patients assumed (and were granted) authority over the 
other participants, with the result that the final ‘consensus’ was dominated by their 
views. By defining one group as having particularly relevant attributes, the role of 
others was diminished. Similarly, Smith and Wales (2000) argue against attempting to 
create a microcosm of the wider society in the deliberative forum because participants 
may then see themselves as defined and divided by demographic characteristics.  
 
In our own work to specify a capability list in the context of equality and human rights 
monitoring for Britain, we ran 11 events with a total of 187 participants (for details 
see Burchardt and Vizard, 2011). We kept the size of each event relatively small 
(average group size 17 and maximum 32) to promote trust between participants and 
high-quality discussion, but we ran a sufficient number of events that people with a 
wide range of characteristics could participate, thus aiming to take on board both the 
‘deliberationist’ and ‘participationist’ perspectives. In many cases, however, the final 
group size was determined more by the difficulty of recruitment than by the quality of 
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discussion likely to ensue, and the total number of events was likewise affected by 
pragmatic considerations of time and cost.  
 
Participants were recruited by Ipsos-MORI using telephone and on-street quota 
sampling. Three groups were drawn from the general public, in London, Edinburgh 
and Cardiff/Wrexham. The remaining groups were each drawn from a specific 
population: lesbian, gay and bisexual people; people with mobility impairments; 
people from ethnic minority groups; Pakistani women; Bangladeshi men; elderly 
people and carers; teenagers (age 13-16); children aged 9-12 and parents of younger 
children.
3
 Our aim was to include sufficient numbers of the general public to obtain a 
broadly representative picture, while at the same time ensuring that the particular 
experiences of groups believed to be at higher risk of discrimination or disadvantage 
were heard, steering a middle course, we hoped, between generalisability and 
marginalisation.  
 
At least two value judgements were implicit in the design of our own work: that we 
would privilege the views of disadvantaged people as ‘experts’ on inequality and 
discrimination, but not to the exclusion of the views of the general public — a 
decision that gave rise to difficulties at the analysis and interpretation stage — and 
that the groups we identified as disadvantaged would be based on sex, ethnicity, 
disability, age, sexual orientation and religion (six of the ‘protected grounds’ in the 
2006 Equality Act).
4
 The apparently technical question of participant selection 
therefore comes back to some fundamental issues: to what extent are participants 
viewed as citizens, capable of setting aside their individual identities and preferences 
to engage in public reasoning, to what extent are they viewed as experts, bringing their 
particular experiences (for example as users or patients or members of a minority 
group) to bear on the discussion, and to what extent are they viewed as self-interested 
individuals whose opinions need to be carefully weighed against each other to reach a 
final decision. Each view implies a distinct sampling strategy: for citizens, a small but 
random group – as in a criminal justice jury – is sufficient, for experts, purposive 
sampling is required with careful consideration of coverage and composition, while 
for participants viewed as self-interested individuals, a large-scale random survey is 
implied.  
 
Provision of evidence 
There is widespread recognition that informing participants without manipulating 
them is challenging. It is naïve to assume that information is just a tool for informing 
dialogue and not a source of power (Abelson et al, 2007). If the research aims to 
generate informed views, one must ask informed by whom and what? One response  
                                                     
3
  In Newcastle, Stockport, Birmingham, Leicester, London and Bristol. The project also 
included a total of 15 interviews with people with sensory impairments; a Dyslexic person; 
Sikh, Muslim and Jewish people; and transgender people; but these are not discussed here 
since they were not part of the deliberative exercise.  
4
  Religion was not one of the selection criteria for the deliberative workshops but was reflected 
in the selection of interview respondents. 
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proposed by Carson (2006) is that all briefing documents are agreed in advance with a 
carefully balanced steering group, but arguably this simply pushes the problem one 
step further back to the identification of appropriate ‘balance’ among members of the 
steering group.  
 
Davies et al (2006) suggest that witnesses should be explicitly positioned rather than 
attempt to be neutral, and should include extreme views (although again, what 
constitutes an ‘extreme view’ is always relative to one’s own position). But 
researchers may be caught in a cleft stick: participants are both doubtful about 
attempts to produce balanced information (as reported by Dienel, 1999, in relation to 
his Planning Cells) and critical of any perceived bias in witnesses (according to White 
et al’s 1999 interviews with members of a citizens’ jury). Deliberators know that 
information is always incomplete and partial, and are rightly wary of the material with 
which they are presented. In some studies, participants have been given the 
opportunity to call additional witnesses or ask for additional evidence, and this is 
apparently popular (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; White, Lewis and Elam, 1999). 
However, a sense of incompleteness or a suspicion of bias is not the same as being 
able to detect a specific gap or slant, let alone know how to fill or correct it.  
 
There is also a question of what qualifies as evidence. Academics are inclined to start 
from theories, tables and charts, but this is not always digestible to non-experts and 
may not be perceived as relevant. Barnes (2008) argues for the legitimacy of 
anecdotes and personal experience as a way to communicate issues, following 
Young’s advocacy of the admissibility of rhetoric and story-telling (Young, 2000). 
But as Evans and Kotchetkova (2009) discovered, the inclusion of such material can 
act as an emotional veto over other perspectives and forms of reasoning, reducing the 
scope for effective deliberation.  
 
In the pilots for our own deliberative workshops, we began by offering some basic 
statistics on inequality in Britain. However, these proved to be difficult to 
communicate and in any case highlighting inequality was not, it transpired, the best 
starting point for motivating a discussion about what it was important for people to be 
able to be and do in Britain today. Subsequently we developed a set of vignettes, 
based in part on real cases, of ways in which people’s lives were constrained or 
impoverished. This proved more fruitful in terms of stimulating discussion about what 
was valuable in life. Participants were then invited to engage in two exercises. In the 
first, they were asked to develop, collectively, an account of what it meant to live a 
really good life in Britain today. In the second, we presented a list of central and 
valuable capabilities we had drawn up based on the international human rights 
framework, and asked participants to compare it to the list they had prepared in the 
first exercise, with a view to drawing up a final, considered, list of the things that 
everyone should be able to be and do.  
 
In the event, there was considerable overlap between the lists generated by the first 
exercise and the list we presented for discussion in the second exercise, although our 
list was generally more extensive. But there is little doubt that the contents of our list 
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was a significant influence on the overall outcome of the exercise. Had we presented a 
much more minimalist account of basic capabilities (for example, being adequately 
fed and sheltered and avoiding premature mortality) it is likely that participants would 
have expanded the list, but probably not to the full 10 domains covering economic, 
social and cultural as well as civil and political rights that finally emerged. The 
duration of our workshops (one- or half-day events) did not allow for participants to 
call for additional evidence or witnesses but it is not clear that they would have been 
in a position to know who or what to call to correct, or complement, the perspective 
our material brought to the exercise.  
 
Participants’ views often changed during the course of the workshop, for example, 
coming to appreciate that an aspect of life should be included in a capability list, 
where they had not previously considered it significant. For example, parents and 
older children did not spontaneously identify, ‘developing the skills for participation 
in productive and valued activities, including parenting’ as a central capability for 
children and young people, but strongly endorsed the inclusion of this item in the final 
list. The extent to which it was the material we presented to them and the extent to 
which it was encountering the views of others that was influential is hard to 
determine. In general, research on deliberative methods suggests that people do 
change their opinions, especially on less salient issues (Farrar et al, 2010; Hendriks, 
Dryzek, 2010). 
 
To summarise, while the influence of the researcher’s values on the nature of the 
written evidence presented and/or the witnesses that are called can be mitigated by the 
appointment of a steering group or by allowing participants to summon additional 
witnesses or evidence, it remains a significant factor. Whether or not the information 
deliberators receive plays a critical role in forming and transforming their views 
remains an open question, but to the extent that it is does, the researcher’s own 
position will be an important determinant of the outcome.   
 
Nature of deliberation 
The extent to which deliberative exercises succeed in producing considered views 
depends in part on the nature of deliberation: the length of time allowed and the ways 
in which the discussion is structured and facilitated. Deliberations may last as little as 
a couple of hours or extend over several days. Citizens’ juries tend to be held over 3 to 
5 days, sometimes with a break in the middle to allow time for reflection (Coote and 
Lenaghan, 1997; Carson, 2006; White et al, 1999); deliberative polls take 2 days 
(Fishkin and Luskin 2005); large-scale deliberative summits are usually single day 
events (OLR 2005, 2006) and deliberative workshops may be half or one-day, with or 
without follow-up and/or reconvened groups. Clearly, a longer period of debate 
permits issues and views to be explored in greater depth, with potentially greater input 
from external experts and flexibility over the hearing of evidence, and greater 
engagement between participants. However, extended time commitments may be 
prohibitive for some participants, so researchers face a trade-off between duration of 
deliberation and inclusiveness (especially where participants are not reimbursed for 
their time).   
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Elements of a deliberation include setting ground rules, introduction to the topic and 
purpose of the event, discussion of initial positions, hearing/reading and consideration 
of evidence, debate, and reaching a conclusion. These may be structured in various 
ways, with potentially several iterations between the evidence and debate stages. 
Many of the larger events include a mix of break-out groups and plenary sessions. The 
proportion of time allocated to the various elements depends in part on the complexity 
of the topic and the characteristics of participants (for example, whether they have 
been selected on the basis of their roles as patients, minority groups, etc, or whether 
they have all been recruited as ‘citizens’),  but is also a judgement which reflects the 
priorities of the researcher.  
 
The facilitation of deliberative events is crucial, and requires different skills from 
those used in conventional focus groups, including an understanding of the distinctive 
purpose of deliberation (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997). There are risks associated with 
light-touch facilitation: for example, the emergence of discriminatory behaviour 
(Davies et al, 2006), or the domination of particular individuals or groups in the 
discussion (Evans and Kotchetkova, 2009). Agreeing rules of conduct at the outset can 
help (Smith and Wales, 2000) but does not remove the need for carefully-judged 
intervention. On the other hand, facilitation that is too heavy-handed threatens the 
legitimacy of the exercise and can be manipulative (Abelson et al, 2003).    
 
One crucial decision in the design and facilitation of the deliberation is the degree of 
emphasis on reaching a consensus. Articulating and justifying differences of opinion 
is at the heart of public reasoning, and too great a push to reach a collective view can 
prematurely foreclose explorations of disagreement, and repress minority 
perspectives. Conversely, if the objective of agreeing a common position is not clearly 
present to the participants, a range of views may be expressed and set alongside each 
other, without any genuine engagement between them having taken place. A process 
that ends without reconciling any of the differences between participants has not 
fulfilled the purpose of a deliberative exercise.   
 
Our own deliberative workshops were part- or full-day events, and were facilitated by 
independent professionals rather than by ourselves. The comparatively short duration 
of the events reflected our prioritisation of inclusiveness (a broad range of people 
participating) relative to depth of deliberation, given limited resources. Engaging with 
a fairly abstract topic, the selection of a capability list, even when described and 
explained in accessible and non-technical terms, was demanding for participants. 
Many started from thinking about what it was possible or realistic for people to be or 
do and found it difficult to make the leap to consider what it would be desirable, in 
public policy terms, for everyone to be able to be and do. Facilitation of the discussion 
and external the stimuli provided were therefore all the more important.   
 
As described above, three of our workshops were drawn from the general public and 
the remainder were recruited on the basis of specific socio-demographic 
characteristics. This structure meant that for the most part, discussion took place 
within somewhat homogeneous groups, and had the advantage of providing a safer 
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space in which normally minority perspectives could be explored and articulated 
(Young, 1989). For example, the workshop conducted with Pakistani women included 
several who were not confident English speakers and was carried out in Urdu – they 
would have been effectively excluded from a general public deliberation. Similarly, 
lesbian, gay and bisexual people may have felt more comfortable speaking out about 
issues of particular importance to them (‘being able to be yourself in a public place’ 
was suggested as an addition to the capability list by this group) because they were in 
a workshop specifically for them. However this aspect of the design of most of our 
workshops also meant that engagement with the views of others was limited to others 
who shared a particular characteristic, which both artificially boosted the salience of 
that characteristic in the discussion, and meant that it fell to the researchers to 
integrate the conclusions arising from the different population subgroups, rather than 
that function being performed within the workshops themselves. This is an illustration 
of the tension between recognising (and seeking to redress) imbalances of power and 
representation, and providing a single forum in which differences can be examined 
and subject to critical scrutiny from a full range of participants. 
 
Analysis and interpretation 
Where a clear consensus or decision has been reached, the role of the researcher in 
analysis and interpretation is limited (Evans and Kotchetkova, 2009). However, in the 
case of large-scale exercises, some aggregation or analysis by sub-group is likely to be 
necessary (Dienel, 1999; Orr, 2007).  Crocker (2003) encourages attention to 
disagreement within the group including dissent which may not be verbalised as such, 
and placing emphasis in the report on the process as well as the outcome (Van 
Stokkom, 2005; White et al, 1999). Davies et al (2006) recommend that where there 
are unresolved disagreements, facilitators should produce a report giving an account 
of the reasoning behind the different conclusions. Ideally, any report should be 
checked with the participants to ensure it is an accurate reflection of their views, 
although this can be difficult if views change once participants are back ‘in the real 
world’.  
 
Depending on the objective of the research, there may also be interest in comparing 
the views of participants pre and post deliberation, to assess the extent to which the 
evidence provided, together with the discussion between participants, changed 
people’s views. This is built into the structure of Fishkin and Luskin’s Deliberative 
Polls and is a feature of a number of other deliberative projects. Understanding the 
extent to which values are fixed, or are subject to transformation through information 
and discussion, may be informative in itself.  
 
Where multiple events are held, as in our own work, researchers necessarily have a 
role to play in combining and interpreting the results. Differences in outcomes 
between groups can simply be reported as such, but if the objective is to identify a 
common position (for example, an agreed poverty threshold or capability list), some 
procedure for combining results is needed. In our case, we adopted a simple 
‘accumulation’ rule: if a capability was cited by any group as being central and 
valuable to life in Britain today, it was included in the final capability list, even if it 
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was not specified by all groups. This ensured that capabilities highlighted by some of 
the groups at particular risk of discrimination and disadvantage, but not mentioned by 
the general public groups, featured in the final capability list. The ‘accumulation rule’ 
was transparent and straightforward to apply but we were greatly helped by the 
objective being to create a comprehensive capability list and therefore having no pre-
determined limit on its length. Had the exercise been intended to prioritise amongst 
capabilities on the list, or to produce a much more restricted list, the decision rule for 
combining results from multiple events would have required a judgement, for 
example, about the weight to be accorded to the views of minority groups.  
 
Summary 
The distinctive objective of deliberative research is to elicit a considered, informed 
collective value judgement from the general public. In delivering this objective, 
researchers confront a series of methodological challenges: the selection of 
participants (whose considered views?), the provision of evidence (informed by 
what?), the structure of the deliberation (considered through what process?) and the 
analysis of potentially conflicting results (what constitutes a collective judgement?) At 
each point, apparently technical methodological questions are found to embed 
substantial normative considerations. The consequences for the use of deliberative 
research are considered in the next section. 
 
5. Discussion 
The ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory has generated a wealth of deliberative 
projects and experiments. Research in this context is often conflated with 
policymaking, consultation and stand-alone public engagement exercises, yet the 
purpose of deliberation as a research technique is distinctive. The primary function of 
research is to contribute to knowledge and understanding — in this case, uncovering 
the public’s values — rather than to bring intrinsic or instrumental democratic 
benefits, or to influence policy. Of course, some of these benefits may arise as by-
products of deliberative research, but the evaluation of research as research needs to 
be based on criteria such as transparency, reliability and validity, and not on its 
contribution to democratic legitimacy or accountability. 
 
So, when is deliberative research appropriate? We have seen it is particularly well-
suited to situations where the challenge is to identify an informed, considered, and 
collective view. In the social science context, this often arises in relation to research 
on poverty, well-being and inequality, where there is a need to define and justify the 
thresholds and concepts adopted on a deeper basis than convention alone can offer. 
This application is of course closely related to the theoretical origins of deliberative 
research in democratic theory, with its emphasis on public reasoning.  
 
Comparing deliberative research to more traditional methods of studying the values of 
the general public, such as in-depth interviewing, attitudinal surveys, and participatory 
approaches, reveals that adopting a deliberative research design involves a number of 
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epistemological and normative assumptions. It implies a distinction between facts 
about the world, which can be illuminated by reference to external experts, and the 
real values of the participants (and the public in general), which can be ascertained 
only through discussion and interaction between people. Thus it shares the positivist 
assumptions of large-scale surveys in relation to ‘facts’ but the interpretativist view 
more usually associated with in-depth interviewing and ethnography when it comes to 
values. In common with participatory approaches, it emphasises a collective process, 
but while the participatory paradigm champions insider expertise – the lived 
experience of the disadvantaged, for example – in deliberative research, the injection 
of information, including through use of external experts, is regarded as an essential 
ingredient. Finally, while much social research on values seeks to explore and explain 
differences, deliberative research prioritises the search for a consensus or a collective 
decision.   
 
Putting deliberative research into practice involves making another set of judgements, 
including trade-offs between quality and quantity of deliberation, between 
representativeness and inclusiveness, between treating participants as citizens or as 
representatives of groups with particular experiences and characteristics, between 
redressing power imbalances through protected space for disadvantage groups and 
integrating diverse perspectives in a single forum, and between recognising dissent 
and promoting consensus.  
 
Normative decisions therefore permeate the design and implementation of deliberative 
research, so while it certainly has a unique contribution to make, it by no means lets 
researchers ‘off the hook’ of making value judgements. Rather the judgements move 
from the outcome (what poverty threshold should we use) to the process (adopting a 
deliberative paradigm and setting the parameters of the debate). As with any 
technique, the appropriateness of deliberative research depends on clarity in the 
reasons for using the approach, the goodness of fit between the research question and 
the tool in hand, and on how the tool is used. For the purposes of defining a collective 
position on normative questions in social science, such as a poverty threshold or 
capability list, it has the potential to provide uniquely considered, insightful and well-
justified answers – but transparency at all stages of the process is essential if the 
charge of being simply a mirror of the researcher’s own values is to be avoided.  
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